CONFESSION, TESTIMONY, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DISCIPLINARY KNOWLEDGE IN THE THERAVĀDA VINAYA
Keywords:
Theravāda Vinaya, Bhikkhu Pātimokkha, Confession, Testimony, Disciplinary Knowledge, Epistemic ResponsibilityAbstract
Disciplinary judgment requires an account of conduct that can be assessed against the conditions of an applicable rule. This article investigates how confession and testimony contribute to that account within the Theravāda Vinaya, focusing on the Bhikkhu Pātimokkha and selected procedural passages from the Mahāvagga and Cūḷavagga. It employs textual interpretation and epistemological analysis, distinguishing canonical prescriptions from later explanations and reconstruction. The discussion examines the disclosure of remembered offences during uposatha, the acknowledgement of conduct, trustworthy witness reports, the prohibition of groundless accusations, and the relationship between admissions and the settlement of disciplinary issues. It argues that confession and testimony have different evidentiary functions. Confession makes a person's account of their conduct available for disciplinary consideration, whereas testimony supplies information from another perspective. Neither function eliminates the need to identify the relevant facts, preserve distinctions between observation and suspicion, interpret the applicable rule, and follow the appropriate procedure. The analysis further distinguishes the establishment of facts from their classification as an offence and from the institutional resolution of an issue. These distinctions explain why truthful communication is necessary but does not by itself guarantee a justified disciplinary conclusion. Contemporary work on testimony and epistemic injustice provides comparative questions concerning credibility and responsible hearing without being attributed to the ancient texts. The article concludes that selected Vinaya practices can be interpreted as an ethically governed framework for establishing disciplinary knowledge. Its contribution is a focused analytical model connecting disclosure, assessment, normative classification, and procedurally accountable judgment within a canonical tradition.
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